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consequently when the notice was served on them the plaintiff had at least
implied notice that an appeal was being taken. His appearance in the
appellate court shows that the notice was sufficient in fact.
An opposite result in the case might be justified on another ground.
Since the statute deals with notices of appeals it might be interpreted in
the light of another statute8 on notices. The latter statute states that the
service of a notice on the attorney of a person constitutes service on that
person. So the sentence of the statute in the principal case which reads
"or by delivering a copy of the same to the appellee"' ) could be interpreted
as validating the service on the appellee even though made on his attorneys.
Liberally construed the statute is remedial in its nature and there is no
need for legislative action to change its harshness; a judicial decision could
interpret it correctly without overstepping judicial powers.1 o Thus it seems
that the principal case was decided on a technicality which by liberal con-
struction of the statute would be removed without changing its meaning or
purpose. M.A.H.
CIVI POCEDU-APPELAT PRACTIc--BIIMW OF EXCEPTMONS-[Mis-
souri].-Respondent, within ten days after the service of appellants' ab-
stract, filed written objections questioning the failure of the abstract to
show the filing of the motion for new trial and the bill of exceptions. Ap-
pellants refused to amend their original abstract. Held: Appeal should be
dismissed on ground that the record proper was insufficient to show error.
Brown -v. Reichmann.1
The above failure to grant an appellate review on the merits is in accord
with the strict and technical distinction now recognized in Missouri be-
tween the record proper and the bill of exceptions.2 Prior to the develop-
ment of the art of stenography and the use of official court reporters, oral
proceedings were not immediately and officially preserved. The bill of ex-
ceptions made by the attorney himself, and later signed by the court, was
therefore a necessary and proper method of recording that which other-
wise would exist only in memory.3 In 1825 the Missouri Legislature codi-
fied,4 with some moderate changes, the common law and equity principles
concerning the record proper and the bill of exceptions, and for 117 years
our courts have given force to the distinction even though now, as provided
by statute, oral proceedings are officially recorded5 and the dependency on
memory no-longer provides a reason for the rule of decision.
As a consequence of the changed conditions, many states as well as the
8. R. S. Mo. 1939 §910.
9. R. S. Mo. 1939 §2741.
10. Hender v. Ring (1895) 90 Wis. 358.
1. (Mo. App. 1942) 164 S. W. (2d) 201.
2. R. S. Mo. 1939 §§1174, 1175. Wallace v. Woods (1936) 340 Mo.
452, 102 S. W. (2d) 91.
3. Williams, Appellate Practice (1942) 7 Mo. L. Rev. 158, 161-163.
4. Mo. Laws of 1825, 631.
5. R. S. Mo. 1939 §13295.
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United States have successfully abolished the distinction6 through legis-
lation. The Missouri Appellate Courts are well aware of the need for re-
form. The St. Louis Court of Appeals by its rules of court 7 has attempted
to lessen the harshness of the distinction and insure a review on the
merits.8 Rule 34 states that the recital in the abstract to the effect thab
a motion for new trial and a bill of exceptions have been duly iled is
sufficient for a review on the merits. Rule 33 requires respondent to file
written objections within ten days after appellant's abstract has been
served on him and in cases where respondent has failed to do so, the court
has overruled a motion to dismiss the appeal.9 In spite of the above de-
cisions there is the class of cases similar to the instant case. In these the
appellant has included all the needed information in the record proper and
the bill of exceptions. However, on a motion to dismiss the appeal, the
appellant is thrown out on the procedural point that a court cannot ex-
amine the bill of exceptions unless the abstract contains a statement thaA
the bill of exceptions has been duly filed.1 The complete abolition of the
distinction by statute would be required to remedy this latter line of cases,
for the courts may not, without an enabling act, override the "exception"
statute."1
A proposed general code of civil procedure recommended by the advisory
committee appointed by the Supreme Court of Missouri expressly abolishes
the distinction between the record proper and the bill of exceptions. 12
Should the proposed code be adopted, appeals would no longer be dismissed
on the ground of a failure to state in the record proper that the bill of ex-
ceptions had been properly filed. H. B. C.
6. Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) Vol. 2 §21-936; Federal Rule 46, 308 U. S.
Appendix 60; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937) c. 110, §204; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929)
§20-1139; N. M. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, 1929) §105-830; N. Y. C. P. A.
(1927) §§583, 445, 446, all as amended by N. Y. Laws 1936 c. 915; 2 N. D.
Comp. Laws Ann. (1913) §7653; Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, 1936)
11560; 1 S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) §2542; Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933)
1§104-39-2, 104-28-18; Wis. Stat. (1941) §270-39.
7. Rule 33 and Rule 34, St. Louis Court of Appeals.
8. Gneckow v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1937) 108 S. W.
(2d) 621, reversing Gneckow v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1936)
99 S. W. (2d) 126; after opinion quashed State ex rel. Gneckow v. Hostetter
(1937) 340 Mo. 1177, 105 S. W. (2d) 928.
9. Hicks v. Gus Gillerman Iron & Metal Co. (Mo. App. 1940) 138 S. W-
(2d) 749; Gneckow v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1937) 108 S. W. (2d)
621; Hemphill v. City of Morehouse (1912) 162 Mo. App. 566, 142 S. W.
817, 818.
10. Northcutt v .McKibben (Mo. App. 1942) 159 S. W. (2d) 699; Warner
v. Howard (1936) 339 Mo. 923, 98 S. W. (2d) 613; Angldile Computing
Scale Co. v. Carter (Mo. App. 1918) 206 S. W. 231; Walker v. Fritz(1912) 166 Mo. App. 317, 148 S. W. 991.
11. R. S. Mo. 1939 §1174.
12. Proposed General Code of Civil Procedure for the State of Missouri,
Plan II, Art. 13, §1.
19421
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol28/iss1/9
